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Abstract
The increase in wage inequality in Russia during its transition process has far exceeded
the increase in wage dispersion observed in other European countries undergoing transition.
Russia also has an extremely large incidence of wage arrears.  We analyse to what extent wage
arrears affect the wage distribution and measures of wage inequality in Russia.  We present
counterfactual distributions, derived from a variety of different methods, which suggest that
conventional measures of earnings dispersion would be some 20 to 30 per cent lower in the
absence of arrears. We then go on to show how wage gaps at various points in the pay
distribution across gender, education, region and industry are influenced by a failure to allow for
wage arrears. Using our counterfactual estimates we show, for example, that the median gender
wage gap would be around twenty-five points higher than the actual gap that we observe.
Similarly, the counterfactual ratio of mean graduate pay to mean pay of those with primary
education is around twenty points lower than observed.  We show that the parameters of the
counterfactual wage distributions are very similar to the parameters of the observed wage
distributions of those not in arrears. This means that for those wishing to study aspects of wage
differentials and inequality in Russia, it may be feasible to use the subset of those not in arrears
and still get close to the true population parameters.  
JEL Classification No.: J6
Key Words: Wage Arrears, Earnings Inequality, Counterfactuals, Transition
Economies, RussiaWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Wage Arrears and the Distribution of Earnings in Russia
Hartmut Lehmann and Jonathan Wadsworth
I.  Introduction.
Wage inequality in Russia following the end of central planning has risen far more than in
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries undergoing transition. According to estimates
based on official statistics, the Gini coefficient for wages in Russia rose from 0.22 before
transition to around 0.5 in 1996 and the 90:10 income decile ratio tripled from 3.3 before
transition to 10 in 1995  (Flemming and Micklewright, 1997).  In contrast, over the same period,
the estimated Gini index for wages in CEE grew from levels in the range of 0.2 to 0.25 to levels
in the range 0.3 to 0.35.  The level of wage inequality in Russia is now also very high by
international standards.
1 Rising earnings dispersion seems to have been the major factor behind
rising inequality in personal incomes.
All these trends are now well documented in the literature.  But the reasons for (a) the
sharp increase in earnings inequality in Russia and (b) the divergence between Russia and Central
and Eastern Europe, are not entirely clear. Why was the rise less pronounced in the advanced
reformer-countries compared to a country lagging in economic reforms, and not the opposite, as
the logic of emerging returns to market oriented skills would suggest? There is little evidence of
any large earnings discrepancies in aggregate data between industries.  A majority of Russian
workers are still employed in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or the government, and therefore
still subject, at least in theory, to regulated normative wages, under the "tariff ladder". The
evidence presented in Brainerd (1998) also suggests that whilst returns to education, if not
experience, have grown over the period, they remain low by Western standards. As such these
factors cannot explain the extent of inequality observed in Russia. 
                                                
1  In Chile, the Gini coefficient is around 0.45 and in Turkey around 0.37.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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One simple explanation of growing inequality in the wage distribution could be the
presence of wage arrears.  If in any given month a substantial subset of workers, receive only a
part of the normal wage, or even no wage at all, then inequality in wages in any given month will
be extremely high.  However, the timing of the dramatic rise in inequality during the first years
of transition documented in Brainerd (1998) indicates to us that most of the rise in inequality
occurred before the problem of wage arrears really began.  Hyperinflation at the onset of reforms
is probably the major contributing factor to the rise in inequality at this time, however, as
inflation subsided inequality has not fallen back. It, therefore, seems important to try to analyse
to what extent wage arrears have affected the earnings distribution since payment problems
began.
Wage arrears have been a pervasive feature of Russian economic life since 1994 affecting
large sections of the workforce (Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999, show that this affects
between 40 and 70 percent of the workforce). The withholding of wage payments has been
systematic and concentrated heavily on sub-sections of the working population (see e.g. Earle and
Sabirianova, 2002, and Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999). An explicit treatment of
distributional effects of wage arrears has, however, not yet been undertaken.
2  Most studies of
wages in Russia tend to ignore the presence of wage arrears without considering the possible
consequences. Using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) data, covering the years
1994 through 1996 and 1998, we explore the issue of how wage arrears have affected the wage
distribution and the level of wage inequality in Russia.
In order to demonstrate the effects of wage arrears on the wage distribution, Table 1 and
Figure 1 give summary measures of the changes in real monthly wage distribution across our
                                                
2 Gimpelson (1998) discusses distributional issues connected to wage arrears from a political rather than an
economic perspective.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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sample period.  We also provide estimates from Poland and Britain as benchmark comparisons
3.
  The Russian data suggest that, by 1998, around 70 percent of employees did not receive a wage
complete and on time, and half of these received nothing in the preceding month. Whilst
disturbing in itself, this finding of a large number of zero wage observations among the working
population means that any conventional measures of inequality based around logarithmic
transformations will be of little use here. In what follows therefore, we focus on the real monthly
wage distributions and eschew any techniques that rely on logarithmic transformations.
Real average earnings fall markedly over the sample period prompted by a series of
national economic crises which left inflation soaring and nominal wages failing to keep pace. The
earnings distribution also widens over the first half of the sample period, while the evidence for
the second half of the sample period is mixed. The coefficient of variation continues to increase,
albeit more gently, but the Gini coefficient and the 90:50 ratio fall back. By 1996, the Gini
coefficient in Russia was more than twice that observed in Poland and 60 percent higher than in
Britain.
It is apparent, however, that the Russian results are strongly influenced by wage arrears.
Figure 2 tracks the increased skewness of the real monthly wage distribution as the incidence of
arrears builds up. The bottom panel of Table 1 confirms that inequality rises by much less
amongst those who receive wages in full during the sample period. The Gini coefficient, for
example, is roughly one third lower for those without wage arrears.
In some sense it is difficult to analyse wage distributions in Russia for this period since
wage arrears scramble the distribution. Persons appear in low deciles solely because they are not
paid at all or paid only part of their wages. So to analyse distributional issues seriously
counterfactual wage distributions for years in which wage arrears are a problem seem to be
                                                
3  The figures for Poland are for full-time workers only, though, as in Russia, part-time working amounts to less
than 3% of the Polish workforce.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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required.
In what follows, we try to estimate what the wage distribution would have looked like
during this period if all workers had been paid in full and on time in order to establish the ￿true￿
parameters of the distribution and any between-group differences. As we argue in the next section
there are several reasons for undertaking such an exercise. We use seven methods to construct
counterfactual distributions. The first is a simple least squares prediction and the second is least
squares with the addition of a random residual, both of which use parameters from a wage
equation estimated on the sample without wage arrears to predict wages for those in arrears.  The
third is a Tobit II extension of the second method, which corrects for the incidental truncation
of the wage distribution (Heckman correction). We then apply a different residual according to
the method proposed by Juhn, Murphy Pierce (1993). We also provide counterfactual estimates
of what the wage distribution would look like if everyone were paid on time following the Kernel
density approach pioneered by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996).  Our sixth method employs
a variation of the exact matching techniques used by, among others, Heckman, Ishimura and
Todd (1997), and Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt (1999), to assign wages to those in arrears by
matching their characteristics to the sub-sample of those who continue to be paid in full but who
had a similar labour market pre-treatment history. The last method matches on the propensity
score (Lechner, 2000). These matching estimators, we suggest, may take account of unobserved
heterogeneity that could be missed by the other approaches. Our results, similar across the
various methods, suggest that most of the earnings dispersion in Russia occurs amongst the stock
of workers affected by wage arrears, and that earnings dispersion may have been some 30 percent
lower in the absence of arrears.
Having estimated these counterfactual distributions we then examine the implications for
                                                                                                                                                       William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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estimates of between-group wage differentials commonly addressed in the literature.  One
interesting application is a reassessment of the analysis of the gender wage gap. Much of the
existing work on the Russian wages has ignored the presence of wage arrears.
4
However, given that, on average, women seem to be less affected by wage arrears (cf. Lehmann,
Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999) we would expect the mean gender gap to be larger with any of
the counterfactual distributions than with the actual observed wages. This prior is confirmed by
our analysis. We also can look at the gender gap sweeping through the entire earnings
distribution, something we cannot do when wage arrears are present on a massive scale.  In
addition, we look at how wage arrears might affect returns to education and relative wage
distributions by region and industry.
In the next section we look at the rationale for constructing counterfactual wage
distributions in the Russian case. The subsequent section presents the various methods employed
to construct counterfactual wage distributions, while section IV discusses data issues. Section V
analyses earnings inequality in Russia and the decomposition of its change over time, followed
by a presentation of the counterfactual results. Section VII then concludes.   
II. Economic Reality in Russia and the Construction of Counterfactual Wage Distributions
The question might be raised why one would like to construct counterfactual wage distributions
in Russia that assume payment of wages in full and on time for all employed members of the
workforce. One could argue that during transition as labour hoarding continues the Russian
economy is confronted with a macro constraint that makes it impossible to pay the contracted
wage. Since mass layoffs are in the short-run politically and economically too costly
5, the
                                                
4 Oglobin (2000) is an exception to this, using a selection equation in his analysis of the mean gender pay gap.
5  Russian labour market legislation stipulates severance pay of three monthly salaries for workers laid off in a
mass layoff.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
6
Russian economy may then be intrinsically unable to honour all contractual wage claims in any
given month.  The practice of wage arrears then, is an economic policy tool that is consciously
chosen by policy makers and managers to deal with output contraction in Russia. Equally, instead
of, for example, imposing an inflationary tax on the entire workforce, the major costs of
transition could be put on the shoulders of weak sub-groups of the workforce by withholding
regular wage payments from them. Wage arrears are, therefore, an integral part of the labour
market experience of many Russian workers. The upshot of these considerations then would be
that the actual wage distribution is what matters and not some elusive counterfactual.
The above lines of reasoning do not preclude, in our opinion, the construction of
counterfactual wage distributions, for the following reasons. First, if wage arrears are brought
about because of a conscious policy of avoiding mass layoffs or a reluctance to use a general
inflationary tax, then we can think of counterfactual wage distributions as reflecting a
counterfactual economic policy that encourages the release of labour from unproductive,
declining sectors. Such a policy, which has been used in most countries of Central and Eastern
Europe despite large initial falls in output, seems to avoid inflationary bottlenecks and reverses
the output decline.  If such a counterfactual economic policy had been chosen those in work
would almost certainly get paid in full and on time
6. 
 Secondly, even if there is no conscious attempt by policy makers and managers to
concentrate the costs of transition on some sub-groups of the workforce, there is no reason to
assume that the ￿non-payment equilibrium￿ (Earle and Sabirianova, 2000) is the only natural,
rational outcome that had to arise in the Russian labour market during transition.
7  In this case
                                                                                                                                                       
6  It may be that there would be differential unemployment levels across the two scenarios. The manner in which
unemployment affects the parameters of the wage distribution in Russia is however unclear. The evidence on
wage arrears emerging from the analysis in this paper suggests that wage arrears are distributed rather randomly
across the wage distribution.
7  Desai and Idson (2000) seem to assume this non-payment equilibrium as the natural outcome in the RussianWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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wage arrears occur because of some constraints that are not exogenous.  The political constraint
that does not allow mass layoffs could have been relaxed as could have been labour market
legislation that imposes too large costs on firms in connection with these layoffs.  One could even
envisage the counterfactual as that which would emerge in the absence of large shocks. In
summary, as long as we can think of sensible counterfactual policy regimes or scenarios it seems
legitimate to construct counterfactual wage distributions.
When we construct counterfactual wage distributions in Russia we make, however, the
assumption that there are no job losses when all workers get paid in full.  Linking thus
constructed counterfactual wage distributions to counterfactual policy regimes, we in essence
presume a bargaining situation where workers are all-powerful and capable of shifting the entire
burden of adjustment onto the enterprise.
8 However, Russian workers are poorly organised and
unions are weak, so the extreme assumption of no trade-off between elimination of wage arrears
and employment is highly unrealistic. Constructing counterfactual wage distributions that take
this trade-off into account is, on the other hand, very difficult as we have no estimates of the
elasticity of employment with respect to wage arrears.
If wage arrears are, however, a problem of irregular pay and not of permanently withheld
wages, then we have a strong rationale for constructing counterfactual wage distributions that
ignore the trade-off between the elimination of wage arrears and employment. Evidence on the
dynamic nature of the arrears process provides this strong rationale for the use of such
counterfactual densities. Aggregate data from Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) tell us that
since 1996 the stock of wage arrears has been approximately in a steady state, equivalent to two
monthly wage bills. This means that the amount of contractual wages not paid to (some) workers
                                                                                                                                                       
transition period
8 In the Western context, Svejnar (1986) shows such outcomes of the wage bargain when workers are all
powerful.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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in month t roughly equals to the amount of wage debts paid back to (some) workers in month t.
9
This implies that even though wage arrears are not a purely stochastic phenomenon in the sense
that incidence is not random, most of the workers affected by them do get paid the owed wages
eventually.  The RLMS provides a monthly data window as far as wage payments are concerned.
This monthly window might then be too narrow to obtain an estimate of the ￿permanent￿
earnings of those workers affected by the irregularity of pay.
10  However, issues dealing with the
distribution of earnings like the gender gap or returns to human capital should be investigated
using estimates of ￿permanent￿ earnings.  The counterfactual distributions constructed by us
provide estimates of such ￿permanent￿ earnings, albeit imperfect ones.
11    
III. Building Counterfactual Estimates of the Effects of Wage Arrears
Counterfactual wage distributions have been applied to a variety of economic and statistical
issues, e.g. minimum wages (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux ,1996), item non-response (Biewen,
1999) and international differences in wage inequality (Blau and Kahn, 1996). The literature
suggests at least 7 ways of building counterfactuals.
OLS methods
Following Oaxaca (1973) we can estimate a wage equation using the sample of those without
                                                
9  Payroll data from the city of Ryazan￿ recently collected by one of us also seem to confirm this pattern.
10  Consider a simple thought experiment. Assume an economy where all workers get paid monthly.   Let us
make the additional assumption that the data window on earnings is the third week of the month in which we
undertake the survey. So, we ask: ￿How much did you get paid in the third week of month x?￿  Some workers
will have been paid their monthly salary in this third week, but many will have been paid in another week of
month x.  Estimation of monthly earnings on this weekly window will be certainly inefficient, or even
misleading.  If, in the Russian case, we had a window of, say, two, three or four months, we could obtain better
estimates of ￿permanent￿ earnings of Russian workers. The construction of counterfactuals is a good substitute
for such estimates.
11 They give imperfect estimates of ￿permanent￿ income since the counterfactuals ignore the losses in earnings
over time due to inflation.  One should recall, though, that wage arrears are particularly virulent in times of low
inflation (Gimpelson, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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wage arrears. Using the vector of estimated parameters from the no arrears equation and the
observed characteristics of those in arrears we then predict wages, which those in arrears would
have received if they had been paid in full.  More formally, let BNW be the vector of parameter
estimates from the wage equation of the sample without wage arrears and let Xi,WA be  a vector
of characteristics of the i-th person who experiences arrears. Then the predicted wage of this
individual, Yi, WA , will simply be:
Yi, WA = B￿NW Xi,WA (1)
Since this method gives only a mean prediction, we can add a residual so as to proxy wage
dispersion in full, since the actual wage equals the sum of the predicted wage and a residual,
w =
^ ^
u w+ . We do this by first taking the standard error of the regression from the no arrears
equation, σ NW, and multiplying by a, randomly assigned, standard normal random variable zi .
 It follows that a random residual which can be added to the predicted wage for the arrears sub-
group then is given by
 ε iWA = zi * σ NW (2)
Heckman Selection Model
If there is any incidental truncation of the wage distribution in case of wage arrears then the
coefficients used in equation  (1) are not consistent if unobserved factors that determine the level
of wages are correlated with unobserved forces driving the incidence of wage arrears. In order
to achieve consistent estimates of the BNW vector we estimate a Tobit II variant of Heckman’s
selection correction model, where the parameters of the selection equation are assumed to be
different from the parameters entering the wage equation. Such an assumption seems reasonable
as the effect of most regressors on the level of wages should be different from their effect on theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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probability  of experiencing wage arrears.   The Tobit II model is estimated using Maximum
Likelihood.  The main difficulty in this estimation is to find a regressor that identifies the model,
as it is hard to think of factors that determine the probability of experiencing wage arrears but not
the level of wages.  Drawing on previous results from our research on the Russian labour market
we use a rural/urban dummy as an identifier in the selection equations , (Lehmann, Wadsworth
and Acquisti, 1999).  We take the estimated coefficients of the no arrears group in the presence
of the selectivity term, apply them to the characteristics of the arrears group and add a random
residual. However, it seems clear to us that the results of the Tobit II model are extremely
sensitive to specification and that alternative methods of constructing counterfactual wage
distributions need to be also explored.  
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Blau and Kahn (1996) have suggested that it may be
worthwhile trying to take into account unobserved heterogeneity as measured by the percentile
ranking of each individual in the residual wage distribution. With a simple transformation of the
residual into the product of a standard normal residual, θ , and the residual standard deviation
from the wage equation, σ , the predicted wage can be written as
Yi, WA = B￿NW Xi,WA + σ NW θ WA                                                               (3)
So that the counterfactual is the set of wages that would result if the no arrears wage coefficients
and residual standard deviation were given to those currently in arrears.  The estimates from the
equations used to construct these estimates are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.  It is apparent
that the estimated coefficients vary widely between the arrears and no-arrears groups. Since many
of the observations on the dependent variable in the arrears sample are zero, this technique relies
on the assumption of normality in the residuals estimated from this subset.
12
                                                
12 This is not always the case in our data.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Kernel Density Counterfactuals
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), (hereafter DFL), have suggested that a broader insight may
be obtained by taking into account the entire wage structure, allowing  the returns to observables
and unobservables to vary across the distribution of wages.  The principal remains the same, to
estimate the wages that those in arrears would receive had they been paid as those paid in full.
Given the joint distribution of wages, w, and characteristics, x, the marginal distribution of wages
conditional on x can be written g(w) = () ( ) dx x h x w f ∫ /  . The conditional expectation, f( ) is
similar to an estimated regression line and the marginal density of x, h( ) is analogous to the
vector of characteristics. Following DFL, using Bayes￿ law, it can be shown that the
counterfactual wage distribution if everybody were paid in full can be obtained by taking the
observed wage distribution of the subset of those paid in full and reweighting by a parameter
Φ (x), where Φ (x) reflects the relative incidence of arrears conditional on characteristics x,
Φ (x) = Pr(No Arrears) / Pr(No Arrears/x). The weights are normalised to sum to one. So, 
gw xfNoArrears w x h x i NoArrears dx () () (/)(/ ) == ∫ Φ
The integral is approximated using Kernel density estimation, which means that we do not get
predictions of individual wages, only the quantiles of the distribution. The numerator in Φ (x) is
the sample proportion of those not in arrears in any year and the denominator is estimated by a
logit regression conditional on a set of observed characteristics. The estimates from the logit
equations used to construct these estimates (Table A2) confirm the dominance of location and
firm characteristics in explaining the incidence of arrears as found in Lehmann, Wadsworth and
Acquisti (1999).
Matching EstimatorsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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If there were unobserved heterogeneity amongst those in arrears, then the preceding techniques
would fail to account for this. The JMP approach and the DFL density approach perhaps come
closest, the latter using the non-parametric structure of the entire distribution. However they
implicitly assume that heterogeneity amongst those not in arrears is duplicated amongst those in
arrears.  If this is not the case, those not in arrears are different from those in arrears, the
counterfactual estimates could be biased in some way. Moreover, the JMP method uses the
standard residuals from the arrears regression to calculate counterfactuals. This standardised
residual is usually interpreted as an individual￿s ranking in the residual wage distribution and as
such a measure of unobserved relative skill. However, the outcome we analyse in equation (3)
gives an individual￿s relative ranking in the residual arrears distribution, which is hard to
interpret as a measure of unobserved skill. This, together with our wish to construct
counterfactuals untainted by arrears leaves this method open to question. 
We therefore experiment with alternative approaches based on the matching estimator
literature. The first technique follows Heckman, Ishimura and Todd (1997) in that we also
condition, non-parametrically, on ￿pre-treatment history￿ in order to minimise biases arising from
unobserved heterogeneity.  In our case this means conditioning on events before wage arrears
began, together with a set of current observable, exogenous characteristics, in order to try and
capture heterogeneity in the arrears population, i.e. to ensure that the treatment and the control
group do not differ systematically. Conditioning on a set of pre-treatment covariates is assumed
to be sufficient to allow the assumption of assignment to the treatment group as random, such
that unobservables may be ignored.  If Yi1 is the outcome with treatment and Yi0 is the outcome
without treatment for individual i and X and H are sets of controls for observable characteristics
and ￿pre-treatment history￿, then the identification assumption becomes,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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E(Yi0 / T = 1, X, H) = E(Yi0 / T =0, X, H ). Heckman, Ishimura and Todd (1997) find that for this
type of matching estimators to work well the same data set should be used for the control and
treatment group, the groups should be in the same local labour markets and the data set should
contain a rich set of variables relevant to the treatment decision.
Treatment in our study is the experience of wage arrears and the labour market history
we condition on, using the panel element of the RLMS, is labour market status one year earlier
and if employed, the ranking in the wage distribution of those paid in full.  If the individual was
out of work one year earlier we create unemployed and inactive categories. If the individual was
in arrears one year earlier we create a separate sub-category.  We divide last year￿s wage
distribution, excluding arrears, into deciles. Matching proceeds for those sub-groups of the
treated and the non-treated who have the same ￿pre-treatment history￿, and in addition we match
according to age (with a maximum allowed difference of ten years), gender, region (3 groups)
and qualifications (6 groups) in the current year. This strategy conforms broadly to the criteria
set out by Heckman et al. (1997) required for a good performance of a matching estimator. Also,
the assumption here is that the variables used for matching are not affected by the treatment
(arrears).
13
We assign the wages of those currently paid in full to those in the treatment group, who
were placed in the same decile a year ago when both treatment and control groups were paid in
full.   Those in arrears now who were also in arrears last year or non-employed are given the
wages of those currently paid in full who were in the same category one year earlier. In this way,
we hope to reduce the difference in unobserved skills and other characteristics that might exist
between the individuals experiencing wage arrears and those who are unaffected by them.  If
more than one person can be matched with the individual we assign the average wage of the
                                                
13   Whilst within region mobility may be affected by arrears, the regions in the RLMS are so large as to make
mobility between regions as a result of arrears unlikely.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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matched controls.  With this direct matching procedure the set of variables used is much smaller
than can be afforded by a regression based technique which is unaffected by empty cells. The
matching algorithm is shown in Box A1 in the appendix.
The approach assumes that individuals do not move rapidly through the earnings
distribution. As a check, Table A3 in the appendix presents one and four-year earnings transition
matrices using quintiles of the wage distribution. It is apparent that, whilst there is a degree of
mobility across earnings quintiles, there is considerably less mobility amongst those not subject
to wage arrears.  Figure 3 also suggests that those in arrears are drawn from across the entire
wage distribution. Since this approach can only be used when there are at least two consecutive
years of longitudinal data, we confine our estimates using this approach to 1996 and provide
comparable estimates using the other counterfactual techniques.
Propensity Scores
When performing non-parametric matching we lose around 10 per cent of potential
matches due to empty cells.  To avoid this, we also employ  propensity score matching, where
individuals are matched  according to the closeness in the estimated probability of experiencing
 wage arrears. We use the matching algorithm suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1998).
14 We
estimate probit regressions, conditional on the same co-variates as used in the matching
approach, take the predicted probability ￿ the propensity score - and match, with replacement,
those in arrears with those not in arrears with the nearest propensity score. It can be shown that
                                                                                                                                                       
14  As Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt (2001) state, ￿the reduced dimension comes at a cost, however. The
propensity score is not known and has to be estimated. Also, in samples of limited size, for some i and j it may occur
that p(Xi)=p(Xj) even if Xi≠ Xj, resulting in imperfect balancing of the distributions of covariates.￿ The literature
stresses that there seems to be a bias vs. efficiency trade-off between non-parametric and propensity score matching.
Smith and Todd (2001) show that estimates from different propensity score matching methods do not vary much as
long as the conditioning variables satisfy the requirements set out by Heckman et al. (1997).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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if Yi1 and Yi0 are independent of treatment, T, given X and H (that is, given sufficient
disaggregation by age, sex and region, for example, as well as by "pre-treatment history"), then
the two groups may be treated as the same. In other words, T is ignorable given X and H, so that
E(Yi0 / T = 1, P(X,H)) = E(Yi0 / T =0, P(X,H) ) = E(Yi0 /  P(X,H) ). We estimate two
variants of the propensity score, one where pre-treatment variables are included in the set of co-
variates and one without them. In the latter case the identification assumption becomes,
E(Yi0 / T = 1, P(X)) = E(Yi0 / T =0, P(X) ) = E(Yi0 /  P(X) ).  
IV. Data.
Our main data source is the second phase of the Russian Longitudinal Monitor Survey, (RLMS),
a longitudinal panel of around 4000 households across the Russian federation conducted in the
autumn of 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998. The data contains a set of demographic and establishment
characteristics, together with information on the labour market activities of its sample. Despite
its relatively small size, the advantage of this source for our purposes, is that we can track
individual wages and the incidence of wage arrears over time. We restrict our sample to
employees of working age and exclude the military.
15 The survey design does not follow
individuals if they move, but does sample new occupants of the same address. There are around
10,000 individual observations in each wave, of which around 4000 are in work in any wave and
around 3,500 give wage related information.  
The survey questions dealing with wage arrears ask whether, conditional on being in
work, an individual was owed money by the firm in the past month or was paid ￿in kind￿ with
goods produced by the firm. This constitutes our sample of those in arrears in any wave.  Some
                                                
15 The RLMS is ambiguous on the nature of self-employment, referring instead to the extent of self-ownership in
the enterprise where the individual works. We exclude only those who say they own between 51 and 100% of the
enterprise.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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of those in arrears are paid a certain amount of money, whilst others, around one half of those in
arrears, receive nothing.
16 Respondents, both those paid in full and those in arrears, are asked to
state the amount of money received from their employers after tax in the past month. These are
total wage receipts and not contractual wages. There is no distinction made between basic wages
and bonus. These wage responses are then deflated by a national price deflator indexed to 100
at January 1998.
17 There is no indication whether wage arrears are estimated before or after tax.
We remove outliers from that data, namely those earning in excess of 4000 roubles a month, or
less than 50 roubles if the respondents are not in arrears.
We also provide some data from a smaller, household survey data set, VTsIOM,
undertaken in 1993 in order to provide summary evidence on pay from an earlier period when
wage arrears were less prevalent.
V. Earnings Distributions and Inequality in Russia
Table 2 provides a formal decomposition of changes in earnings inequality over the
period into its between and within-group components. 
18   Following Cowell (1995) we can
decompose any generalised entropy measure of inequality
19
Ia = Ibetween + Iwithin
where
                                                
16  The RLMS also asks for the total amount owed, together with the number of months since the worker was
paid last.
17 There are no population weights in the data sets.
18 Fields￿ (2001) decomposition of the sources of wage inequality relies on a decomposition of the log variance
of earnings, which is inappropriate here given the large number of zero wage observations.
19 Note that this approach calculates the between group component assuming that everyone within a group
receives mean income, which is clearly not the case in RussiaWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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So total within group inequality is a weighted average of inequality in each sub group, though
the weights do not add to one unless θ =1 or 0. This decomposition is sensitive to the choice of
parameter θ , so in Table 2 we present estimates based on two different θ  values. The results
suggest that differences between those in arrears and those not accounts for around 20 to 30
percent of the rise in inequality between 1994 and 1996. The majority of the rise in inequality
however comes from within the group in arrears.  The results are more ambiguous over the
second half of the sample period. Inequality rises or falls depending on the value of θ  used, as
do the within and between group components.  The entropy estimate based on the low θ  value
falls between 1996 and 1998 most likely because low values put more weight on distances
between wages in lower parts of the distribution and the share of those paid zero wages falls. This
is not reflected in the other entropy estimate, which rises as it gives greater weight to wage
changes in the upper tail. It remains true however that the majority of earnings inequality in any
one period comes from amongst those in arrears.
Table 3 gives the results using the first four estimation approaches and the propensity
score matching estimation without conditioning on pre-treatment history for the years 1994, 1996
and 1998. Figure 4 graphs the counterfactual Kernel densities.  Not surprisingly the mean andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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various centiles of the distributions are all higher using the counterfactual estimates. Mean
earnings rise by around 30% in 1994 and between 50% and 70% when wage arrears were highest
in 1998.  Similarly estimated overall dispersion, as measured by the coefficient of variation, is
between 23% and 36% lower in 1994 and between 29% and 46% lower in 1998.  The Gini
coefficients are now in the same range as those of Britain.  The estimates of the various wage
centiles show a narrower distribution when based on simple OLS predictions (OLS I) and the
propensity score matching estimator than the estimates based on other methods. Since simple
OLS estimation performs a regression to the mean, it comes as no surprise that the OLS I based
earnings counterfactual distribution is narrower; it this feature of OLS estimation that provides
actually a justification for the addition of a random error term. The larger 9-to-1 and 5-to-1 decile
ratios for the OLS II and Heckit estimates can be explained by the skewness of the wage
distribution. Adding a random normal residual to the predicted value will then generate too many
negative values for predicted wages, giving a very low value for the 10-th percentile.
Table 4 uses the panel element of the data in order to add the exact matching estimator
and a second propensity score estimator with ￿pre-treatment history￿ included as an additional
 regressor. We compare the results with those using the other methods for the year 1996. We also
show the distribution of those in the sample who get paid in full and on time (second column).
Apart from the estimates based on simple OLS prediction (OLS I) all other counterfactual
distributions have a very similar spread as can be seen from the close coefficients of variation and
the GINI coefficients. The distribution of the propensity score estimates seems to depend on the
set of covariates used to generate the propensity scores. It also noteworthy that the no arrears
distribution differs little from the counterfactuals, a point to which we will return later. 
We now examine the implications of these counterfactual estimates for pay gaps betweenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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various sub-groups of the workforce. In Table 5 we compare levels and ratios of pay across
gender using the actual distribution, the no arrears distribution and the counterfactual
distributions for the year 1996.  If everyone were paid in full, then there would be more
dispersion in pay between men and women. If we exclude the propensity score estimates, the
mean gender wage gap rises from the observed 19 percentage points to between 28 and 32
percentage points when counterfactual distributions are used.  Also noteworthy is the fact that
five of the counterfactual distributions show the largest wage gap at the tenth percentile, while
in Western economies the widest divergence between male and female earnings usually occurs
at the ninth decile.    The no-arrears distribution gives mean and median ratios that are very
similar to the levels of all but the propensity score based counterfactuals.  On the other hand, the
no-arrears distribution shows no variation of the ratios across deciles, which does not hold for
any of the counterfactuals.
Table 6 shows mean and medium wages of three educational categories (graduate,
intermediate and primary) and presents mean and medium ratios relative to the low educational
category using the actual, the no arrears and all counterfactual distributions. It is striking that the
actual distribution suggests a higher relative return to graduate education than the counterfactual
estimates, while there is little difference in the relative returns for the intermediate group. It is
also noteworthy, that the ratios from the no arrears distribution are again quite similar to those
from the counterfactual distributions. 
We now turn to two dimensions that impact strongly on the incidence of wage arrears,
region and industry. We divide the sample into three areas: those living in Moscow and St.
Petersburg (Metro), where the incidence of wage arrears is low and wages are high; those living
in the Urals region, where wage arrears are massive, but wages are highest; and those living inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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the rest of the country, where wages are lower and the incidence of wage arrears is high.  The
actual distribution gives a 25% higher mean wage gain from living in one of the metropolitan
regions  compared with the counterfactuals and, ignoring the propensity score estimates,
understates the mean wage difference between Urals and other regions by 20% on average. For
the median ratios these biases are even more pronounced (Table 7).
In Table 8 we aggregate industries into two sectors, production and services, with
workers in the former more likely to experience wage arrears than in the latter. There are
discernible differences between the ratios of the actual and the other distributions at the median
 and the 90
th percentile. The counterfactual distributions suggest that if everyone were paid in
full, then there would be more dispersion in pay between production and service sectors. The
production sector seems to be more affected by wage arrears than services resulting in an increase
of roughly 30% points as one goes from the actual to the no arrears or the counterfactual
distributions.
VII. Conclusions
Russia now has one of the highest levels of wage inequality in the world. While wage arrears
were not responsible for the large increase in inequality, the estimates in our paper suggest that
they may have been partly responsible for the failure of inequality to fall back following the
unanticipated price shocks in the first half of the nineties. The majority of earnings inequality is
experienced within the population experiencing wage arrears at any point in time. The large share
of employees who receive no wages in any one month renders many conventional estimates of
inequality inoperable. Counterfactual estimates of the wage distribution in the absence of arrears
indicate that average earnings would be some twenty to fifty percent higher, depending on theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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extent of arrears and that earnings dispersion would be lower by similar amounts if everyone
were paid in full. This puts earnings inequality back towards levels of inequality currently
experienced in Western countries like Britain and the United States. 
On the basis of the counterfactual distributions we find higher gender wage gaps through
most of the distributions, with the mean gap taking on values approximately 10 percentage points
higher than the actual gap in the year 1996.  In contrast, our estimates suggest that the relative
return to graduate education would be compressed by around 15 percent if everybody were paid
in full. Regional pay differentials would become more compressed and sectoral differentials
would be widened in the absence of wage arrears.
One striking feature of our exercise is that the parameters of the counterfactual wage
distributions are very similar to the parameters of the observed wage distributions of those not
in arrears. While this does not mean that experience of wage arrears is a random event as
confirmed by evidence in Earle and Sabirianova (2002) and Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti
(1999), it does suggest that those in wage arrears are drawn reasonably uniformly from
throughout the wage distribution. For those wishing to study aspects of wage differentials and
inequality in Russia, it may, therefore, be feasible to use the subset of those not in arrears and still
get close to the true population parameters, subject to an efficiency loss.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Figure 1. Real Wage Distribution 1994-98 (RLMS)
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Figure 2. Distribution of Real Wages in Russia
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Figure 3. Decile Origin of Those in Wage Arrears
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Figure 4. Counterfactual Estimates of Wage Distribution in Absence of Arrears
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Table 1.  Summary Measures of Real Monthly Wage Distribution
1993
VTsIOM
1994
RLMS
1996
RLMS
1998
RLMS
1996
Poland
1998
Britain
Total
Mean    930 867 547 396 140 1247
90th 1724 1563 1464 968 219 2316
50th 690 469 338 242 120 1054
10th 276 0 0 0 81 271
% no pay 0.4 18 32 26 0 0
90/10 6.25 n/a n/a n/a 2.70 8.55
90/50 2.5 3.33 4.33 4.00 1.83 2.20
50/10 2.5 n/a n/a n/a 1.48 3.89
Coef. Var 1.12 1.05 1.26 1.31 0.62 0.80
Gini 0.410 0.535 0.622 0.613 0.239 0.387
% arrears 9 49 66 72 0 0
No Arrears
Mean 944 845 948 660
90
th 1724 1818 1989 1355
50th 690 625 688 491
10th 276 200 229 166
90/10 6.25 9.09 8.69 8.16
90/50 2.5 2.91 2.89 2.75
50/10 2.5 3.13 3.00 2.96
Coef. Var 1.12 0.80 0.79 0.85
Gini 0.407 0.414 0.409 0.419William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table 2. Between and Within Group Real Wage Inequality by Arrears 
1993
VTsIOM
1994
RLMS
1996
RLMS
1998
RLMS
Entropy (θ=0.5) 0.298 0.660 0.979 0.900
within arrears
(wi)
0.003 0.435
(.39)
0.731
(.52)
0.715
(.61)
within no arrears 0.264 0.171
(.60)
0.123
(.44)
0.107
(.37)
between group 0.031 0.054 0.125 0.078
%Share Between Group Inequality
(θ=0.5)
0.3 8.1 12.8 8.1
% Change in inequality accounted
for by between group
N/a N/a 22.3 59.5
[10.0]
Entropy (θ=2.0) 0.622 0.546 0.798 0.856
within arrears 0.037 0.208
(.21)
0.345
(.26)
0.481
(.39)
within no arrears 0.584 0.286
(.89)
0.316
(1.01)
0.286
(.79)
between group 0.001 0.052 0.137 0.089
%Share Between Group Inequality
(θ=2.0)
0.2 9.4 17.2 10.4
% Change in inequality accounted
for by between group
N/a N/a 34.1 -82.8
[11.9]
% in Arrears  9.1 48.7 66.3 71.7
Note. Figure in square brackets in column 5 give the change of between-group shares from 1994 to 1998. Figures
in round brackets give within-group weights. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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 Table 3. Counterfactual Real Wage Distributions
Mean
90
th
Pctile
Median 10
th
pctile
90/10 90/50 50/10 Coef.
Var.
Gini
1994
Actual 609 1500 422 0 N/a 3.55 N/a 1.08 0.546
OLS I 793 1500 665 210 7.14 2.25 3.17 0.73 0.380
OLS II 800 1689 644 150 11.26 2.62 4.29 0.83 0.447
Heckit 818 1719 662 156 11.01 2.59 4.24 0.81 0.438
JMP 794 1655 618 186 8.89 2.68 3.32 0.84 0.424
DFL 788 1687 582 178 9.48 2.89 3.27 0.84 0.426
PS I 802 1562 631 253 6.17 2.48 2.49 0.69 0.359
1996
Actual 500 1376 287 0 N/a 4.79 N/a 1.32 0.636
OLS I 830 1452 739 262 5.54 1.96 2.82 0.66 0.342
OLS II 841 1743 727 124 14.05 2.39 5.86 0.84 0.457
Heckit 919 1880 803 172 10.93 2.34 4.67 0.77 0.423
JMP 830 1720 619 229 7.51 2.78 2.70 0.85 0.410
DFL 817 1720 585 184 9.35 2.94 3.18 0.85 0.419
PS I 749 1465 583 223 6.57 2.51 2.61 0.79 0.395
1998
Actual 371  907 206 0 N/a 4.40 N/a 1.33 0.618
OLS I 580 1030 500 167 6.17 2.06 2.99 0.75 0.367
OLS II 590 1291 484 66 19.56 2.66 7.33 0.94 0.503
Heckit 634 1356 533 91 14.90 2.54 5.85 0.88 0.471
JMP 580 1209 423 136 8.89 2.85 3.11 0.95 0.442
DFL 571 1210 417 121 10.00 2.94 3.40 0.95 0.442
PS I 577 1124 434 158 7.11 2.59 2.75 0.85 0.405
Source: RLMS. Note: OLS I is OLS estimate without residuals, OLS II includes residuals, PS I is estimate based
on propensity score without conditioning on pre-treatment history.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table 4. Counterfactual Real Wage Distributions, 1996
Actual No
Arrears
OLS I OLS II Heckit JMP DFL Match. PS I PS II
Mean    510 839 820 814 886 819 813 798 825 807
90
th 1284 1720 1405 1720 1740 1720 1720 1641 1720 1720
50
th 322 635 732 688 782 609  608 596 648 596
10
th 0 225 268 122 172 229 195 225 229 206
90/10 n/a 7.64 5.24 14.09 10.11 7.51 8.82 7.29 7.51 8.35
90/50 3.99 2.71 1.92 2.50 2.22 2.82 2.83 2.75 2.65 2.88
50/10 n/a 2.82 2.73 5.64 4.54 2.66 3.11 2.64 2.83 2.89
Coef. Var 1.26 0.81 0.65 0.83 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.83
Gini 0.621 0.411 0.336 0.449 0.416 0.403 0.411 0.407 0.402 0.417
Source: RLMS. Notes. See Table 3. PS II is estimate based on propensity score conditioning on pre-treatment
history.  Sample size = 2538, of which 1351 are in arrears and 1187 are paid in full and on time.
Table 5. Comparing the Gender Wage Ratio, (1996)
Actual No
Arrears
OLS I OLS
II
Heckit JMP DFL Match
.
PS I PS II
Men
Mean  569 1013  972 967 1051   972   949   970  918 887
Median  337 803  917 898  980   737   788   745  749 683
90
th 1490 2199 1562 1865 1984 1973 1950 2178 1950 1950
10
th      0 287  344 225   268   350   241   305  229 229
Women
Mean  462 716   693 698   761   693   697   662  748 741
Median  310 539   605 575   642   526   516   520  563 563
90
th 1147 1464 1212 1515 1620 1376  1456 1311 1548 1577
10
th      0 195   229 108   145   191   178   185 212 195
Ratio
Mean    0.81 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.81 0.84
50
th 0.92 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.82
90
th 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.70 0.75 0.60 0.79 0.80
10
th n/a 0.68 0.66 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.74 0.61 0.93 0.85
Source: RLMS. Sample size=2538, of which 1153 are male and 1385 female.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table 6. Comparing Education Wage Ratios, (1996)
Actual No
Arrears
OLS
I
OLS
II
Heckit JMP DFL Match
.
PS I PS II
Upper
Mean  600 903  900 910  969   900   902   886  860 853
Median  401 688  792 802  859   688   688   688  675 631
Intermed
Mean  436 779   749 786   870   749   760   729  807 780
Median  229 597   687 688   767   573   573   563  642 573
Low
Mean  434 760   757 722   804   757   709   709  776 751
Median  229 470   676 581   675   573   459   458  573 563
Ratio:
Low
Mean
upper
1.38 1.19 1.19 1.26 1.21 1.19 1.27 1.25 1.11 1.14
Inter 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.09 1.08 0.99 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.04
Median
upper
1.75 1.46 1.17 1.38 1.27 1.20 1.49 1.50 1.18 1.12
Inter 1.00 1.27 1.02 1.18 0.54 1.00 1.25 1.23 1.12 1.02
Source: RLMS. Sample size=2538, of which 1157 are upper, 888 intermediate and 493 lower.
Table 7. Comparing Regional Wage Ratios, (1996)
Actual No
Arrears
OLS
I
OLS
II
Heckit JMP DFL Match
.
PS I PS II
Metro.
Mean  758 1027 1036 1042 1094 1036   906  1002  923 924
Median  563 803  945  917  962   788   802   803  788 688
Urals
Mean  630 1305 1213 1253  1346  1213  1270  1176 1132 982
Median  189 1032 1130 1146  1296   940   963   705  844 642
Other
Mean  439 734  719 727   802   719   716   715  763 758
Median  275 573  655 642   688   563   513   570  573 573
Ratio:
Other
Mean
Metro
1.73 1.40 1.44 1.43 1.36 1.44 1.27 1.40 1.11 1.22
Urals 1.44 1.80 1.69 1.72 1.68 1.69 1.77 1.64 1.04 1.30
Median
Metro
2.05 1.40 1.44 1.43 1.40 1.40 1.56 1.41 1.18 1.20
Urals 0.69 1.80 1.73 1.79 1.88 1.67 1.69 1.24 1.12 1.12
Source: RLMS. Sample size=2538, of which 427 are metropolitan, 241Urals and 1871 other.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table 8. Comparing Industry Wage Ratios, (1996)
Actual No
Arrears
OLS I OLS
II
Heckit JMP DFL Match
.
PS I PS II
Product
ion
Mean  527 886  853 874  965   852   839   845  843 829
Median  271 681  788 756  863   624   596   653  676 608
10
th 0 229 275 130  212  251  206  229  229 229
90
th 1261 1834 1452 1945 1970 1720 1720 1720 1720 1834
Services
Mean  462 805  788 789   844   788   788   755  808 787
Median  344 605  688 688   745   596   614   573  630 573
10
th 0 206 258 149  169  229  194  225  217 200
90th 1305 1689 1351 1605 1689 1605 1605 1463 1720 1720
Ratio
Mean    1.14 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.08 1.06 1.12 1.04 1.05
50
th 0.79 1.13 1.15 1.10 1.16 1.05 0.97 1.14 1.07 1.06
10
th n/a 1.11 1.07 0.87 1.25 1.10 1.06 1.02 1.06 1.15
90th 0.97 1.09 1.07 1.21 1.17 1.07 1.07 1.18 1.00 1.07
Sample size=2538, of which 1227 are production and 1312 services.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Appendix
Box A1
Exact matching – algorithm and scheme of conditioning on pre-treatment history
Exact matching algorithm
I.  Condition on following possible pre-treatment labour market history:
-  employed and fully paid and in xth decile of wage distribution
-  unemployed
-  inactive
-  employed and experiencing wage arrears (WA)
II.  Match treated individuals to individuals with same pre-treatment history using
following observable characteristics:
-  gender
-  region (4 categories)
-  qualifications (6 categories)
-  age (maximum allowed difference of 10 years – choose those controls that have the
minimum age difference)
Assumption: these variables are not affected by the treatment (WA).
Because treated are more than potential controls, matching is done with replacement.
III.  Assign wage of matched control to treated individual, or assign average of wages
of matched controls
Scheme of Conditioning on pre-treatment history by example
Pre-treatment period Treatment period
Potential Control 1 in 95 Potential Control 1 in 96
Employed and fully paid and in Employed and fully paid
2
nd decile of wage distribution
Treated 1 in 95 Treated 1 in 96
Employed and fully paid and in In wage arrears
2
nd decile of wage distribution
Potential Control 2 in 95 Potential Control 2 in 96
Unemployed Employed and fully paid
Treated 2 in 95 Treated 2 in 96
Unemployed In wage arrearsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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 Table A1. OLS Real Weekly Wage Estimates
1994 1996 1998
No Arrears Arrears No Arrears Arrears No Arrears Arrears
Female -328.844 -82.797 -333.160 -40.009 -233.198 -66.771
(24.318)** (28.675)** (36.521)** (23.981) (25.946)** (16.803)**
Age 27.947 5.922 24.714 4.414 35.168 4.891
(6.544)** (8.201) (9.800)* (6.724) (6.817)** (4.694)
Age2 -0.389 -0.092 -0.367 -0.069 -0.449 -0.093
(0.077)** (0.098) (0.116)** (0.080) (0.081)** (0.056)
University 379.099 112.386 243.810 91.789 266.344 140.187
(37.974)** (46.869)* (54.541)** (36.136)* (41.377)** (25.664)**
Technical 190.469 2.117 69.194 54.203 57.383 47.081
(36.510)** (42.481) (52.169) (33.435) (40.152) (24.389)
PTU 1 49.374 -43.377 -117.411 -24.110 -38.326 2.641
(40.950) (45.926) (61.551) (37.010) (44.640) (26.754)
PTU 2 29.637 -66.157 -34.488 45.818 -105.285 -1.476
(47.106) (53.921) (72.830) (46.796) (53.254)* (30.662)
Other Quals. 42.720 -82.750 -144.592 -48.117 -14.694 45.585
(42.341) (47.680) (66.053)* (36.181) (48.155) (28.830)
North West 83.355 -248.990 -74.875 -283.137 118.066 -116.845
(51.778) (73.535)** (78.128) (65.712)** (57.282)* (48.022)*
Central -265.516 -306.965 -311.085 -318.211 -179.586 -218.597
(39.265)** (63.264)** (57.314)** (60.239)** (42.953)** (43.774)**
Volga -368.290 -311.739 -474.672 -440.988 -215.499 -251.302
(40.676)** (62.459)** (61.497)** (59.326)** (45.960)** (43.270)**
Caucasus -308.003 -339.224 -313.739 -399.983 -205.358 -260.768
(45.716)** (65.725)** (69.570)** (61.104)** (50.731)** (46.063)**
Urals -190.510 -185.588 -273.558 -228.785 -189.485 -181.967
(41.643)** (64.530)** (62.013)** (59.346)** (46.324)** (44.090)**
Western Siberia 198.770 -247.740 189.993 -337.197 230.365 -193.010
(48.672)** (68.635)** (73.810)* (62.005)** (56.277)** (46.780)**
East 82.152 -190.736 -133.817 -363.395 -22.999 -191.335
(48.010) (66.243)** (83.308) (61.224)** (54.385) (45.698)**
State -86.539 -34.385 -178.204 -27.526 -117.536 -58.777
(25.128)** (29.600) (39.320)** (24.746) (27.499)** (17.230)**
Agriculture -250.863 -97.303 -251.971 -60.974 -169.516 -111.494
(59.234)** (54.806) (95.687)** (52.865) (57.422)** (32.569)**
Manufacturing -11.362 15.018 46.962 46.869 -93.825 -35.587
(45.083) (52.705) (71.786) (51.275) (44.513)* (29.455)
Construction 257.273 282.506 291.500 174.120 75.914 -23.680
(57.922)** (62.508)** (98.849)** (62.138)** (68.167) (38.384)
Energy 260.745 1.952 441.998 244.459 146.231 92.060
(52.590)** (70.162) (85.853)** (58.332)** (52.746)** (34.916)**
Transport 232.231 38.041 300.775 91.000 71.933 105.861
(52.218)** (63.508) (81.381)** (60.297) (50.453) (36.463)**
Retail 41.109 234.521 30.394 152.660 76.558 58.465
(51.443) (72.558)** (78.304) (67.108)* (49.225) (44.084)
Finance 383.194 729.191 457.864 427.141 131.729 111.311
(94.452)** (187.211)** (122.168)** (215.898)* (84.225) (100.764)
Health/Education -65.742 79.929 28.073 -19.806 -92.157 -20.960
(42.608) (55.645) (69.499) (49.456) (41.488)* (28.996)
Firm size 11-50 -9.312 11.026 27.490 -0.066 83.296 -69.379
(47.472) (57.127) (73.808) (53.442) (55.176) (37.761)
Firm size 51-100 13.184 54.215 -12.727 46.439 40.027 -28.619
(53.774) (64.810) (83.160) (58.747) (60.579) (41.245)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Firm size 101-500 78.130 109.737 47.045 62.613 66.823 -19.890
(48.484) (57.951) (76.932) (53.216) (58.393) (37.207)
Firm size 501-1000 177.653 189.683 86.523 59.353 293.726 -6.018
(51.093)** (60.095)** (80.915) (57.817) (60.541)** (39.212)
Firm size missing 55.855 37.957 2.156 -27.662 93.407 -22.801
(48.708) (58.531) (70.627) (52.176) (55.107) (36.204)
Job Tenure 1-2 yrs 50.552 -15.643 99.058 53.044 61.998 33.746
(40.085) (50.518) (63.362) (43.535) (43.738) (28.735)
2-5 yrs -44.714 12.982 184.181 66.827 72.079 32.913
(35.527) (43.460) (54.085)** (37.186) (38.963) (24.867)
5-10 yrs -14.406 -15.183 125.330 25.428 73.904 62.436
(39.176) (45.520) (60.085)* (38.875) (42.646) (26.842)*
10-20 yrs 25.448 -3.080 120.659 13.702 99.791 56.950
(38.021) (45.063) (60.814)* (37.612) (45.074)* (27.370)*
20 yrs+ 112.283 -32.667 159.724 62.463 102.873 113.582
(44.758)* (52.423) (68.120)* (42.388) (50.534)* (30.381)**
Constant 470.968 412.070 727.343 401.153 33.770 350.394
(142.358)** (181.035)* (206.173)** (155.882)* (152.983) (107.224)**
N 2645 1332 1368 1532 1669 1674
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.11William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table A2. Logit Estimates of Probability of Not Being in Arrears
1994 1996 1998
Female 0.273 0.148 0.100
(0.078)** (0.088) (0.080)
Age -0.028 -0.025 -0.043
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022)*
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
University -0.110 0.358 0.266
(0.125) (0.131)** (0.125)*
Technical -0.164 0.310 0.216
(0.116) (0.124)* (0.120)
PTU 1 -0.056 -0.004 0.056
(0.127) (0.142) (0.133)
PTU 2 0.022 0.276 0.068
(0.147) (0.173) (0.155)
Other Quals. 0.030 -0.149 0.221
(0.132) (0.147) (0.142)
North West -0.810 -1.205 -1.206
(0.184)** (0.208)** (0.201)**
Central -0.446 -0.616 -0.745
(0.153)** (0.176)** (0.170)**
Volga -0.659 -1.067 -1.252
(0.153)** (0.177)** (0.173)**
Caucasus -0.695 -1.136 -0.944
(0.167)** (0.194)** (0.191)**
Urals -0.561 -1.015 -1.095
(0.157)** (0.178)** (0.176)**
Western Siberia -0.826 -1.264 -1.270
(0.173)** (0.196)** (0.196)**
East -0.884 -1.777 -1.335
(0.169)** (0.208)** (0.192)**
State -0.271 -0.182 -0.270
(0.080)** (0.093)* (0.083)**
Agriculture -0.760 -0.716 -0.383
(0.168)** (0.221)** (0.172)*
Manufacturing -0.382 -0.401 -0.582
(0.143)** (0.180)* (0.138)**
Construction -0.530 -0.462 -0.617
(0.173)** (0.232)* (0.194)**
Energy 0.319 -0.230 -0.202
(0.178) (0.208) (0.161)
Transport -0.010 0.265 0.099
(0.168) (0.207) (0.162)
Retail 0.355 0.482 0.622
(0.184) (0.216)* (0.182)**
Finance 0.792 1.955 1.039
(0.434) (0.564)** (0.377)**
Health/Education 0.396 -0.235 -0.311
(0.143)** (0.174) (0.131)*
Firm size 11-50 0.045 -0.048 0.297
(0.156) (0.191) (0.180)
Firm size 51-100 0.155 -0.178 0.335
(0.178) (0.212) (0.196)
Firm size 101-500 0.161 -0.373 -0.038William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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(0.159) (0.196) (0.183)
Firm size 501-1000 0.002 -0.192 0.150
(0.167) (0.209) (0.193)
Firm size missing -0.044 0.076 0.169
(0.160) (0.186) (0.177)
Job Tenure 1-2 yrs 0.080 0.075 0.294
(0.134) (0.158) (0.137)*
2-5 yrs -0.004 0.182 0.283
(0.117) (0.134) (0.120)*
5-10 yrs -0.180 0.026 0.270
(0.125) (0.145) (0.130)*
10-20 yrs -0.108 -0.136 0.231
(0.122) (0.143) (0.135)
20 yrs+ -0.190 -0.118 0.205
(0.143) (0.160) (0.151)
loc3 -0.592 -0.483 -0.508
(0.100)** (0.119)** (0.106)**
Constant 2.065 1.710 1.911
(0.480)** (0.535)** (0.493)**
N 3977 2899 3341
Log L -2364.0 -1818.6 -2158.9William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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Table A3. Earnings Mobility in Russia, 1994-98
a) 1994/95
Total 1995
1994 1
st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5
th Quintile
1 46.5 21.1 12.2 10.8 9.5
2 20.9 37.8 25.3 10.6 5.1
3 17.1 22.5 31.5 21.9 7.0
4 11.1 8.2 22.2 34.8 23.9
5 11.0 5.2 8.2 20.7 54.8
No Arrears 1995
1994 12345
1 62.5 25.0  12.5
2     49.8 33.5 10.9 5.0
3     21.6 41.6 29.2 7.6
4     4.9 24.4 43.2 27.4
5 1.5 6.3 23.6 68.5
b) 1995/96
Total 1996
1995 1
st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5
th Quintile
1 58.9  8.0 14.6 11.5 7.1
2 36.8 17.5 29.0 11.5 5.2
3 25.1 7.9 33.8 24.2 9.0
4 21.1 2.5 20.2 32.3 24.0
5 17.2 1.8 8.7 20.2 52.1
No Arrears 1996
1995 12345
1 
2     21.3 54.6 19.4 4.6
3     3.0 49.4 38.1 9.5
4     1.0 15.4 48.0 35.6William Davidson Institute Working Paper 421
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5 1.4 3.2 20.7 74.7
c) 1995/98
Total 1998
1995 1
st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5
th Quintile
1 41.2 17.7 18.2 13.7 8.9
2 30.8 24.6 26.0 13.3 5.3
3 24.9 10.8 29.7 23.9 10.8
4 19.9 7.1 17.9 31.9 23.1
5 14.9 3.4 12.3 24.9 44.6
No Arrears 1998
1995 12345
1 50.0 16.7 33.3
2     21.1 43.7 29.6 5.6
3     3.5 41.4 41.4 13.8
4     2.6 15.7 44.4 37.8
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